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1 Introduction
An attractive view of epistemic rationality classifies it as a species of instru-
mental rationality according to which rationality consists in taking the means
to an end. For instance, Quine (1986) seems to support this view when he
writes that
[. . . ] normative epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the
technology of truth-seeking [. . . ] [I]t is a matter of efficacy for
an ulterior end, truth [. . . ] The normative here, as elsewhere in
engineering, becomes descriptive when the terminal parameter is
expressed. (Quine 1986: 664–665)
In a recent paper Thomas Kelly (2003) criticizes this view. For him epistemic
rationality is
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roughly, the kind of rationality which one displays when one
believes propositions that are strongly supported by one’s evi-
dence and refrains from believing propositions that are improba-
ble given one’s evidence. (Kelly 2003: 612)
Kelly holds that epistemic rationality cannot be understood as a form of
instrumental rationality, because an agent may lack the relevant cognitive
goal while still being epistemically rational. Suppose an agent does not have
the cognitive goal of believing the truth or has other, overriding goals. In this
case it is not necessarily instrumentally rational for her to believe a certain
proposition even if the latter is strongly supported by her evidence, and thus,
on Kelly’s view, a proposition which it would be epistemically rational for
her to believe.
In his reply Adam Leite (2007) points out a way the instrumentalist
conception of epistemic rationality can be defended. He distinguishes
questions about what the evidence supports from questions about
what a person ought to believe. (Leite 2007: 456)
By tying epistemic rationality to what a person ought or, as Kelly (2007:
467) puts it, has reason to believe rather than to what her evidence supports
the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality can be saved.
In his reply Kelly argues that this way out is not viable, because the
relevant notion of evidence or evidential support is normative. Therefore,
Kelly claims, “there is no gap between possessing evidence that some propo-
sition is true and possessing reasons to think that that proposition is true”
(Kelly 2007: 468). In other words, Kelly seems to think that if evidential
support is a normative notion, then an agent ought, or has reason, to believe
a proposition if and only if that agent’s evidence supports that proposition.
In this paper we claim, with Leite and against Kelly, that an agent’s pos-
sessing evidence that supports a proposition and that agent’s de facto having
reason to believe that that proposition is true come apart when the agent
does not have the relevant epistemic goal of believing the truth about that
proposition. This is so despite the fact that evidential support is a norma-
tive notion, for it is a hypothetically, as opposed to categorically, normative
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notion. Accordingly we hold that epistemic rationality is instrumental ratio-
nality given the goal of believing the truth: an agent’s belief in a proposition
is epistemically rational if and only if that agent has reason to believe that
proposition given she has the goal of believing the truth about that proposi-
tion.
We also claim, with Kelly and against Leite, that epistemic rationality
is tied to what the evidence supports rather than to what one has reason
to believe. Believing a proposition that is supported by one’s evidence is
instrumentally rational for believing the truth about that proposition.
Finally we show that the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rational-
ity can be saved, because epistemic rationality is tied to evidential support,
evidential support is hypothetically normative, and therefore epistemic ra-
tionality is a form of instrumental rationality.
For ease of presentation we start by considering only individual beliefs and
the question of their instrumental rationality. Specifically, we do not consider
the case of two or more beliefs, let alone the case of belief systems. In the
final section we drop this restriction and consider global goals concerning an
agent’s belief system in order to correctly state our positive arguments.
First, however, let us hear what Kelly and Leite have to say about evi-
dential support and instrumental rationality.
2 Kelly and Leite on Evidential Support and
Instrumental Rationality
For Kelly being epistemically rational is tantamount to believing what one’s
evidence supports, which in turn is tantamount to believing what one has
reason to believe. Call this Kelly’s trinity (Figure 1).
epistemic rationality⤡ ⤢
reason to believe ↔ evidential support
Figure 1
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Kelly’s trinity consists of three claims. The first claim (I) equates epistem-
ically rational beliefs with beliefs supported by one’s evidence. The second
claim (II) equates beliefs supported by one’s evidence with beliefs one has
reason to believe. The third claim (III) equates epistemically rational beliefs
with beliefs one has reason to believe.1
(I) epistemic rationality ↔ evidential support
(II) evidential support ↔ reason to believe
(III) epistemic rationality ↔ reason to believe
(III) is an implicit claim in Kelly (2003) insofar as he does not seem to
distinguish between beliefs that are epistemically rational and beliefs that one
has reason to believe. (I) is an explicit claim insofar as epistemic rationality
is characterized in terms of what the evidence supports (Kelly 2003: 612).
(II) is a consequence of (I) and (III).
This picture of the relation between epistemic rationality, evidential sup-
port, and reason to believe leads Kelly to doubt the instrumentalist con-
ception of epistemic rationality. According to Kelly (2003: 621) “the most
serious reason for skepticism about the instrumentalist conception of epis-
temic rationality is this: what a person has reason to believe does not seem
to depend on the content of his or her goals in the way that one would expect
if the instrumentalist conception were correct”. Kelly assumes that what ev-
idence a person possesses and which propositions this evidence supports does
not depend on the goals this person actually has. Since Kelly (2003: 612)
presupposes that epistemic rationality is “the kind of rationality which one
displays when one believes propositions that are strongly supported by one’s
evidence” he concludes that epistemic rationality does not depend on the
content of a person’s goals.
In support of his view Kelly (2003: 621) notes that we ordinarily talk as
if reason to believe was categorical reason to believe. Another reason, Kelly
thinks, is “that one can have epistemic reasons to believe propositions even
in cases in which it is clear that one’s believing those propositions holds no
promise of advancing any goal which one actually has” (Kelly 2003: 630).
1Kelly (2003; 2007) and Leite (2007) mostly use the terms ‘epistemic reason’, ‘reason
to believe’, and ‘epistemic reason to believe’ synonymously.
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For Leite Kelly is begging the question when he characterizes epistemi-
cally rational beliefs as beliefs supported by one’s evidence.
The instrumentalist need not accept that this is a kind of ra-
tionality at all—except insofar as one has the goals (whatever
they might be) which would make such behavior instrumentally
rational. (Leite 2007: 457)
On behalf of the instrumentalist Leite suggests separating the question
of what one has reason to believe from the question of what is supported by
one’s evidence (Leite 2007: 456). In terms of Kelly’s trinity he denies (I) as
well as (II).
Having epistemic reasons to believe that p is having epistemic
reasons to do something : to form a belief on a certain subject
matter. But the mere possession of strong evidence doesn’t give
me a reason to form a belief. There are many propositions which
it would be pointless for me to bother to take any attitude to-
wards, even though I possess strong evidence in their favor. I
can’t justly be charged with irrationality—even with epistemic
irrationality—for failing to do so. (Leite 2008: 561)
Leite subscribes to (III) and contends that one can defend the instru-
mentalist conception of epistemic rationality by characterizing the latter in
terms of reason to believe rather than evidential support. Call the result
Leite’s duality (Figure 2).
epistemic rationality⤡ ⤢̸
reason to believe ↮ evidential support
Figure 2
Leite’s rejection of (II) is a natural picture to have on a non-normative
view of evidential support. For instance, if evidential support is defined
in terms of a frequentist notion of reliability, then what is supported by
one’s evidence may come apart from what one has reason to believe, if only
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because one is not aware of the obtaining evidential relationships. According
to both Kelly and Leite the notion of evidential support required by the
instrumentalist and standing in the requisite relation to reason to believe
“functions as a kind of non-normative substrate for reasons for belief: in
cases in which one does have reasons to think that some proposition is true,
this is so in part because one has evidence that the proposition is true and
in part because one possesses some appropriate goal” (Kelly 2007: 469).
Kelly (2007: 470) agrees with Leite (2007) that there are non-normative
notions of evidential support, but points out that they do not function in
the way required by the instrumentalist. For instance, if evidential support
is defined in terms of a frequentist notion of reliability, then we have a non-
normative notion of evidential support, but that notion does not function in
the required way: the external evidential relationship may obtain and one
may possess the appropriate goal of believing the truth, and yet one does
not have reason to believe that some proposition is true if one is not aware
that the external evidential relationship obtains. Kelly goes on to note that
he does not know of an adequate non-normative notion of evidential support
that functions in the required internal way, and doubts that there is one. In
support of the conjecture that there is none Kelly mainly argues on the basis
of the intuitive (im)plausibility of various examples. One of these proceeds
as follows. If evidential support and reason to believe can come apart, as
Leite holds, then “statements such as the following should have no whiff of
paradox”:
I have overwhelming evidence that p is true. But I have no reason
to think that p is true.
For Kelly the paradoxical character of such statements is best explained
by evidential support being a normative notion. For him “there is no gap
between possessing evidence that some proposition is true and possessing
reasons to think that that proposition is true” (Kelly 2007: 468), if eviden-
tial support is a normative notion. Recall that both Kelly and Leite use
‘has reason to believe’ and ‘ought to believe’ interchangeably: an agent has
reason to believe a proposition if and only if that agent ought to believe that
proposition. Kelly seems to think that, if evidential support is a normative
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notion, then an agent ought to believe a proposition if and only if that agent’s
evidence supports that proposition.
Kelly (2007: 471) admits that his argumentation does “not show that
there is no non-normative notion [of evidential support] that stands in the
requisite relation to the normative concept of a reason for belief and is thus
suitable for the instrumentalist’s purposes”. However, he holds, “it would
be unwarranted to simply assume that there must be some such thing”. He
concludes by locating the burden of proof on the side of the instrumentalist.
Below we discharge the burden of proof and show that a notion of eviden-
tial support in epistemology and the philosophy of science is some such thing.
More precisely, we will show that this notion fits the instrumentalist’s bill by
being hypothetically normative. First, however, let us present our view of
the relation between rationality, reason to believe, and evidential support.
3 Evidential Support and Instrumental Ra-
tionality
In this section we merely present and illustrate our view of the relation be-
tween rationality, reason to believe, and evidential support without positively
arguing for its adequacy.
We propose to replace Kelly’s trinity with our trinity a (Figure 3).
epistemic rationality⤡ ⤢
reason to believe given goal of truth ↔ evidential support
Figure 3
We agree with Kelly’s claim (I), which equates epistemically rational be-
liefs with beliefs supported by one’s evidence. More specifically, we subscribe
to claim (Ia) that it is epistemically rational for an agent to believe a propo-
sition if and only if that agent’s evidence supports that proposition.
(Ia) epistemic rationality ↔ evidential support
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We agree with Leite’s rejection of claim (II), which equates beliefs sup-
ported by one’s evidence with beliefs one has reason to believe. On our view
supporting evidence does not provide a categorical reason to believe. Sup-
porting evidence only provides a hypothetical reason to believe conditional
on the goal of believing the truth, or a reason to believe given the goal of
believing the truth. Kelly assumes that an “instrumental reason is a hypo-
thetical reason, in the sense that it depends for its existence on the fact that
the individual for whom it is a reason possesses a certain goal or goals” (Kelly
2003: 621). Contrary to Kelly we do not assume that hypothetical reasons
may only depend on the agent’s actual goals or, as we prefer to say, her de
facto goals. On our view the “existence” of an instrumental reason does not
depend on whether an individual has the appropriate goal. The instrumental
reason “exists” just in case the appropriate means-end relationship obtains.
Whether an “existing” instrumental reason is also an actual reason for an
agent or, as we prefer to say, a de facto reason for an agent depends on that
agent’s de facto goals.
Restricted to the present epistemological context we call a norm that
holds, and holds only, conditional on a goal a hypothetical norm. A hypo-
thetical norm conditional on some goal is normative insofar as it tells one
what one ought to do given that one has the goal at issue. A hypothetical
norm conditional on some goal does not tell one what one ought to do if one
does not have the goal at issue, let alone what one ought to do uncondition-
ally. Such latter norm we call categorical. A hypothetical norm conditional
on a goal holds just in case there exists a means-end relationship between
the norm in question and the goal at issue. A hypothetical norm conditional
on a goal is descriptive insofar as means-end relationships between the norm
in question and the goal at issue can be described by propositions that are
true or false. One justifies a hypothetical norm conditional on a goal by
establishing that the norm in question is a means to attaining the goal at
issue.
Let us illustrate our view with an analogy. We take it that financial
reasons are paradigmatic examples of instrumental reasons. The existence
of a financial reason to buy a lottery ticket does not depend on an agent’s
de facto goals. A financial reason to buy a lottery ticket exists just in case
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the appropriate means-end relationship obtains. On the standard view the
financial reason to buy a lottery ticket exists just in case buying the lottery
ticket maximizes the agent’s expected financial gain. Whether an existing
financial reason to buy a lottery ticket is a de facto reason for an agent de-
pends on that agent’s de facto goals. Importantly, the existence of a financial
reason to buy a lottery ticket does not imply that the agent has the goal of
maximizing her expected financial gain. Epistemic reasons to believe behave
analogously. The existence of an epistemic reason to believe a proposition
does not depend on an agent’s de facto goals. An epistemic reason to believe
a proposition exists just in case the appropriate means-end relationship ob-
tains. On a view that seems to be compatible with Kelly’s (see the quote and
the presentation of Kelly’s view on the first page of this paper), the epistemic
reason to believe a proposition exists just in case believing the proposition is
(subjectively) probable to result in believing the truth about the proposition.
Whether an existing epistemic reason to believe a proposition is a de facto
reason for an agent depends on that agent’s de facto goals. Importantly, the
existence of an epistemic reason to believe a proposition does not imply that
an agent has the goal of believing the truth about that proposition.
It is interesting to ask why and how the existence of an instrumental
reason to take some action is relevant if it does not guarantee that there exists
a de facto reason for the agent to take that action.It is equally interesting to
ask why and how a hypothetical norm is relevant if it does not tell an agent
what she ought to do.
On our view an agent has a de facto reason to take some action if and
only if the appropriate means-end relationship between the action and the
end obtains, and the end belongs to the agent’s de facto goals. Therefore
the existence of an instrumental reason is relevant, because the agent’s de
facto possessing the appropriate goal turns a merely hypothetical reason into
a de facto reason for the agent. Similarly, a hypothetical norm is relevant,
because the agent’s de facto possessing the appropriate goal turns a merely
hypothetical norm into a de facto norm for the agent, thus telling her what
she de facto ought to do.
Instead of (II) we hold that beliefs supported by one’s evidence coin-
cide with beliefs one has reason to believe given the goal of believing the
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truth. More specifically, we subscribe to claim (IIa) that an agent’s evi-
dence supports a proposition if and only if that agent has reason to believe
that proposition given she has the goal of believing the truth about it.
(IIa) evidential support ↔ reason to believe given goal of truth
Furthermore, we disagree with both Kelly and Leite and reject their claim
(III), which equates epistemically rational beliefs with beliefs one has reason
to believe. Again, on our view the evidence does not provide a categorical
reason to believe. Instead of (III) we hold that epistemically rational beliefs
coincide with beliefs one has reason to believe given the goal of believing the
truth. More specifically, we subscribe to claim (IIIa) that it is epistemically
rational for an agent to believe a proposition if and only if that agent has
reason to believe that proposition given she has the goal of believing the
truth about it.
(IIIa) epistemic rationality ↔ reason to believe given goal of truth
Both Kelly and Leite correctly point out that we sometimes do not aim
at believing the truth about some proposition. Kelly’s (2003: 626) example
of the movie, where he “make[s] a conscious, deliberate effort to avoid finding
out how the movie ends” before viewing the movie, might be a case in point.
We think it is only an example of an agent trying to come to believe the truth
about a proposition in a particularly entertaining way. We do not even want
to exclude that an agent aims at believing the falsity about a proposition.
Believing the truth is not a universal goal in the sense that everybody has
it at any time with respect to every proposition. It is, however, a pervasive
and important goal. Indeed, it is the default cognitive goal. In that respect
believing is similar to asserting. The default goal of asserting is asserting
the truth, and the default goal of believing is believing the truth. However,
just as we sometimes use assertions to comfort, deceive, encourage, and en-
tertain others, independently of whether the assertions are true or false, we
sometimes use beliefs to comfort, deceive, encourage, and entertain ourselves,
independently of whether the beliefs are true of false. A grieving mother may
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aim at believing that her deceased son was a good person in order to comfort
herself, independently of whether her son in fact was a good person and,
hence, not necessarily in order to believe the truth about whether her son
was a good person.
Believing the truth is the default cognitive goal. This explains the para-
doxical character of statements such as:
I have overwhelming evidence that p is true. But I have no reason
to think that p is true.
It also explains why we use ‘rational belief’ as shorthand for ‘epistemically
rational belief’, and why we ordinarily treat reasons to believe as categorical
reasons, both “in offering such reasons to others” and “in responding to
such reasons in the course of one’s own deliberation” (Kelly 2003: 621).
In interpersonal discourse we assume the participants to adopt the default
goal of believing the truth. Unless specified otherwise, we assume that it is
relevant evidence that is offered to us as reason to believe, and we assume
that we are expected to provide relevant evidence as reason to believe. The
assumption of the default goal of believing the truth is not appropriate in all
contexts, though.
If one’s de facto goal with respect to some proposition is not believing
the truth about that proposition, then the reason to believe that proposition
given the goal of believing the truth about it may still exist. The reason is
that the appropriate means-end relationship obtains or does not obtain inde-
pendently of one’s de facto goals. If the appropriate means-end relationship
obtains and one’s de facto goal with respect to the proposition in question
is not believing the truth about that proposition, then epistemic rationality
and actual rationality or, as we prefer to say, de facto rationality come apart.
The claim (IIIb) that we subscribe to is that it is de facto rational for an
agent to believe a proposition if and only if that agent has reason to believe
that proposition given her de facto goals.2 This in turn holds just in case
2More generally, we subscribe to the claim (III∗) that, for all combinations of goals,
X, it is X-rational for an agent to believe a proposition if and only if that agent has
reason to believe that proposition given she has goals X.
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the appropriate means-end relationship between the proposition in question
and the agent’s de facto goals with respect to that proposition obtains.
(IIIb) de facto rationality ↔ reason to believe given de facto goals
Consequently we propose to replace Leite’s duality with our duality b
(Figure 4).
de facto rationality⤡ ⤢̸
reason to believe given de facto goals ↮ evidential support
Figure 4
Thus, if one’s de facto goal with respect to some proposition is not be-
lieving the truth about that proposition, then there may be a gap between
possessing evidence that supports that proposition and having a de facto
reason to believe that it is true.3
For purposes of illustration consider the following stock example. A man
has evidence that strongly supports that his wife is unfaithful. However, he
loves his wife so much that, as he knows, his de facto goals are best served
if he believes that she is faithful, no matter whether or not she in fact is. If
this man believed that his wife is unfaithful, his belief would be supported
by his evidence, even though he would not have reason to believe so given
his de facto goals. If this man achieved believing that his wife is faithful, his
belief would not be epistemically rational, but de facto rational. Love may
be blind, but love need not be irrational!
(III∗) X-rationality ↔ reason to believe given goals X
What we have called epistemic rationality in our trinity a may thus be called truth-
rationality. However, we continue to follow Kelly and Leite in their use of ‘epistemic
rationality’. On our view claim (III∗) is true, because ‘X-rationality’ is synonymous with
‘reason to believe given goals X’.
3We do not exclude that there are collective goals of groups of agents, as opposed
to goals of individual agents, nor that there are objectively valid goals, as opposed to
subjectively desired goals.
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Of course, in examples such as these it often happens that the agent invol-
untarily comes to believe the target proposition which is strongly supported
by her evidence. However, the question of voluntarism should be separated
from the question of the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality.
Maybe the following example brings out the difference between epistemic ra-
tionality and de facto rationality more clearly. Suppose the man who loves
his wife so much and who has evidence that strongly supports that his wife
is unfaithful involuntarily comes to believe that his wife is unfaithful and,
as a consequence, becomes depressive. Suppose further his de facto goals
include curing his depressions and, as he knows, are best served if he re-
presses his belief that his wife is unfaithful. If, by therapeutic means, say,
this man achieved repressing his belief that his wife is unfaithful (and only
this belief without also the evidence strongly supporting it), he would not be
epistemically rational, but de facto rational.
Kelly (2003: 632–634) discusses a strategy such as ours. According to him
distinguishing the possibly hypothetical goal of believing the truth about a
proposition and an agent’s de facto goals “is not enough to save the instru-
mentalist conception of epistemic rationality. The crucial fact here is the
following: whether it is in fact instrumentally rational for me to Φ depends
on the content of the goals which I actually hold. [. . . ] Only goals which I
actually hold make a difference to what is instrumentally rational for me.”
By definition, instrumental rationality is rationality with respect to some
goals. If, on the one hand, the goals with respect to which one judges an agent
to be instrumentally rational are that agent’s de facto goals, then Kelly’s
claim is true, but besides the point. Recall that epistemic rationality and de
facto rationality may come apart if the agent’s de facto goal with respect to
some proposition is not believing the truth about that proposition. So far
we agree. However, on our view the existence of an instrumental reason does
not depend on whether an individual has the relevant goal. The instrumental
reason exists just in case the appropriate means-end relationship obtains.
Whether an instrumental reason is a de facto reason for an agent depends
on that agent’s de facto goals.
If, on the other hand, the goals with respect to which one judges an
agent to be instrumentally rational are not that agent’s de facto goals, then
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Kelly’s claim is false. The good man whose de factogoals are best served if
he donates money in such a way that he will never financially profit from
it is not financially rational, but de facto rational. It does not follow that
financial rationality cannot be understood in instrumentalist terms.
4 Evidential Support Revisited
Let us now discharge the burden of proof and show that a notion of evidential
support in epistemology and the philosophy of science is a hypothetically
normative “notion that stands in the requisite relation to the normative
concept of a reason for belief and is thus suitable for the instrumentalist’s
purposes” (Kelly 2007: 471).
4.1 Evidential Support and Degrees of Belief
In a footnote following the above quote Kelly (2007: 471) refers to Carnap’s
(1962) notion of degree of confirmation, which is a concept of evidential sup-
port that would be suitable for the instrumentalist’s purposes. The reason is
that it is “a wholly non-normative, logical relation” and so “the instrumen-
talist might be in a position to simply identify epistemic rationality with the
instrumental rationality of employing such a logic”.
Kelly correctly points out that Carnap’s project can plausibly be consid-
ered to have failed and that contemporary Bayesians typically define eviden-
tial support in terms of the normative notion of a rational degree of belief
function. Therefore the notion of evidential support is itself normative and
so, Kelly thinks, cannot be related to the normative notion of reason to be-
lieve in the way required by the instrumentalist. (Similarly on page 467,
where he claims that any standard Bayesian notion of evidential support is
normative.) Thus, he claims, a Bayesian notion of evidential support is not
suitable for the instrumentalist’s purposes.
We disagree. Bayesians have two notions of evidential support. Abso-
lute evidential support is defined as conditional probability in the sense of a
probability measure Pr, which is interpreted as the agent’s rational degree
of belief function: r is the agent’s degree of absolute evidential support for
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a proposition h provided by the agent’s evidence e if and only if r is the
agent’s rational degree of belief for h given e, r = Pr(h ∣ e). Incremental ev-
idential support is defined as positive probabilistic relevance in the sense of
a probability measure Pr, which is interpreted as the agent’s rational degree
of belief function: s is the agent’s degree of incremental evidential support
for a proposition h provided by the agent’s evidence e if and only if s is the
difference between the agent’s rational degree of belief for h given e and her
rational degree of belief for h, s = Pr(h ∣ e) − Pr(h).4 For the purposes of
this paper we can identify an agent’s evidence with the logically strongest
proposition e the agent is certain of in the sense of assigning it probability
1, Pr (e) = 1.
Among others because it seems to be the notion Kelly has in mind, we
restrict the discussion to absolute evidential support and show that it stands
in the requisite internal relation to reason to believe, as required by the
instrumentalist. One of us thinks that incremental evidential support can also
be put in relation to reason to believe in a way satisfying the instrumentalist,
but things are more complicated here. One of the reasons why things are
more complicated here is that one additionally has to consider diachronic
rules for updating the agent’s degree of belief function over time besides the
synchronic rules for organizing the agent’s degree of belief function at a given
moment in time. .
Absolute evidential support is internally accessible for the agent, because
it is defined exclusively in terms of the agent’s rational degree of belief func-
tion. If the agent’s degree of belief function is rational in the sense that it
is a probability measure, and if e is the agent’s evidence, i.e. the logically
strongest proposition the agent is certain of in the sense of assigning it prob-
ability 1, then the agent’s rational degree of belief in any proposition h is her
degree of absolute evidential support for h given e. In this sense the agent be-
lieves in accordance with her evidence. Thus, whether it is rational to believe
in accordance with one’s evidence depends on whether probability measures
really are rational degree of belief functions. This in turn depends on the
existence of an appropriate means-end relationship between being a prob-
4There are different ways to measure the difference between the agent’s degree of belief
in h given e and her degree of belief in h. .
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ability measure and having true beliefs, or some other pertinent epistemic
goal. Such an appropriate means-end relationship is exactly what means-end
justifications attempt to establish.
The interpretation of the probability measure as the agent’s rational de-
gree of belief function results in a normative notion of evidential support, as
Kelly rightly notes, since the notion of a rational degree of belief function
is a normative notion. What is wrong, though, is that the normative no-
tion of a rational degree of belief function as well as the resulting normative
notion of evidential support cannot be understood in instrumentalist terms.
On the contrary, ever since Ramsey (1926) philosophers have strived for a
means-end justification of the normative notion of a rational degree of belief
function, thus turning it into a descriptive notion by expressing the terminal
parameter.
Recall that one justifies a hypothetical norm conditional on a goal by
establishing that the norm in question is a means to attaining the goal at
issue. The best known of these means-end justifications is the Dutch Book
argument dating back to Ramsey (1926). The conclusion of the Dutch Book
argument is the norm of probabilism, which is that an agent’s degree of belief
function should obey the probability calculus. An agent’s degree of belief
function is said to be Dutch Bookable if and only if there exists a series
of bets all of which are individually acceptable for that agent, but together
guarantee a sure loss. A bet with gain 1$ on a proposition for price r$ is
acceptable for an agent if and only if that agent’s degree of belief for that
proposition is at least r. The core of the argument is a theorem to the effect
that an agent’s degree of belief function obeys the probability calculus if and
only if it is not Dutch Bookable. Thus, obeying the norm of probabilism is
a (provably necessary and sufficient) means to attaining the end of having
a degree of belief function that is not Dutch Bookable. In other words, the
norm of probabilism has a means-end justification with respect to the goal
of having a degree of belief function that is not Dutch Bookable.
The Dutch Book argument does not establish a means-end relationship
between the norm of probabilism and a cognitive goal, because not accepting
a series of bets that guarantees a sure loss is not a cognitive goal. This is
different in case of the calibration argument due to van Fraassen (1983).
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The conclusion of the calibration argument is the norm of probabilism.
An agent’s degree of belief function is said to be potentially calibrated if and
only if there exists a possible world in which it is calibrated. An agent’s
degree of belief function is calibrated in a possible world if and only if, for
every degree of belief r, the relative frequency or proportion of propositions
that are true in that world among all propositions the agent believes to
degree r approximates r, where approximation summarizes some technical
details that do not matter for present purposes. The idea is that calibration
measures the reliability of degrees of belief as indicators of relative frequen-
cies. The core of the argument is a theorem to the effect that an agent’s
degree of belief function obeys the probability calculus if and only if it is
potentially calibrated. Thus, obeying the norm of probabilism is a (provably
necessary and sufficient) means to attaining the end of having a potentially
calibrated degree of belief function. In other words, the norm of probabilism
has a means-end justification with respect to the goal of having a potentially
calibrated degree of belief function.
The calibration argument does not establish a means-end relationship
between the norm of probabilism and the default cognitive goal of believing
the truth. This is different in case of the gradational accuracy argument
(Joyce 1998, 2009). The latter has been at center stage in a recent discussion
of means-end epistemology (Percival 2002, Stalnaker 2002).
The conclusion of the gradational accuracy argument is the norm of prob-
abilism. An agent’s degree of belief function is said to be accuracy dominated
if and only if there exists an alternative degree of belief function that is at
least as accurate in all possible worlds and more accurate in some possible
world. The accuracy of an agent’s degree of belief function in a possible
world is determined by the accuracy of the agent’s degrees of belief in all
propositions in that possible world. The accuracy of the agent’s degree of
belief in a proposition in a possible world is the distance between the agent’s
degree of belief in the proposition and the truth value of the proposition
in that possible world, where 1 represents truth and 0 represents falsity. A
definition of the accuracy of an agent’s degree of belief in a proposition in
a possible world is implicitly given by axioms that say how to measure the
distance between an agent’s degree of belief in a proposition and the truth
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value of the proposition in that possible world.5 For instance, a degree of
belief up to 1 in a proposition which is true in a possible world is more ac-
curate in that possible world, the higher it is, and perfectly accurate if it
equals 1. The core of the argument is a theorem to the effect that an agent’s
degree of belief function obeys the probability calculus if and only if it is not
accuracy dominated. Thus, obeying the norm of probabilism is a (provably
necessary and sufficient) means to attaining the end of having a degree of
belief function that is not accuracy dominated. In other words, the norm of
probabilism has a means-end justification with respect to the goal of having
a degree of belief function that is not accuracy dominated. Since not being
accuracy dominated is a necessary condition for accuracy, which Joyce (1998:
577ff) claims to be the probabilistic counterpart of truth, the accuracy ar-
gument establishes a (provably necessary) relationship between the norm of
probabilism and the goal of accuracy.
For ease of reference let us repeat the first non-categorically normative
notion of evidential support that we have identified.
(E1) absolute evidential support in the sense of a probability measure Pr,
which is interpreted as the agent’s rational degree of belief function: r
is the agent’s degree of absolute evidential support for a proposition h
provided by the agent’s evidence e if and only if r is the agent’s rational
degree of belief for h given e, r = Pr(h ∣ e), where the agent’s evidence e
is the logically strongest proposition the agent is certain of in the sense
of assigning it probability 1, Pr (e) = 1.
This notion of evidential support is hypothetically normative. It is de-
fined to be identical with a probability measure which is interpreted as a
rational degree of belief function. Therefore, in order to justify the norm
that one ought to believe in accordance with one’s evidence, it is necessary
and sufficient to provide a means-end justification for the norm of proba-
bilism. Since obeying the norm of probabilism is a provably necessary and
sufficient means to attaining the end of having a degree of belief function
that is not accuracy dominated, which in turn is a necessary condition for
5For the latest axiomatic definition of the accuracy of an agent’s degree of belief in a
proposition in a possible world see Joyce (2009).
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accuracy, believing in accordance with one’s evidence is a provably necessary
means to attaining the end of believing accurately. Thus, given that accuracy
is the probabilistic counterpart of truth, believing in accordance with one’s
evidence is a provably necessary means to attaining the end of believing truly
in a probabilistic setting, or to attaining the end of having degrees of belief
in propositions that are close to the truth-values of those propositions.
The goal of not being accuracy dominated is a global goal for degree of be-
lief functions or entire systems of degrees of belief. Therefore the gradational
accuracy argument does not establish a means-end relationship between a
norm for full belief about a single proposition and the local goal of believing
the truth about that proposition, as in our trinity a. However, one can refor-
mulate our trinities a and b for degrees of belief instead of full beliefs, and
one can generalize these trinities to systems of degrees of belief or degree of
belief functions.
For degrees of belief:
• (Ia-d) it is epistemically rational for an agent to believe a proposition
to degree r if and only if that agent’s evidence supports that proposition
to degree r.
• (IIa-d) an agent’s evidence supports a proposition to degree r if and
only if that agent has reason to believe that proposition to degree r
given she has the goal of believing it accurately.
• (IIIa-d) it is epistemically rational for an agent to believe a propo-
sition to degree r if and only if that agent has reason to believe that
proposition to degree r given she has the goal of believing it accurately.
• (IIIb-d) it is de facto rational for an agent to believe a proposition to
degree r if and only if that agent has reason to believe that proposition
to degree r given her de facto goals.
Alternatively one can generalize our trinities a and b from full belief in
a single proposition to systems of full beliefs.
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For systems of full beliefs:
• (Ia-s) it is epistemically rational for an agent with system of full beliefs
R to believe a proposition if and only if that agent’s evidence supports
that proposition.
• (IIa-s) the evidence of an agent with system of full beliefs R supports
a proposition if and only if that agent has reason to believe that propo-
sition given she has the goal of believing the truth about it.
• (IIIa-s) it is epistemically rational for an agent with system of full
beliefs R to believe a proposition if and only if that agent has reason
to believe that proposition given she has the goal of believing the truth
about it.
• (IIIb-s) it is actually rational for an agent with system of full beliefs R
to believe a proposition if and only if that agent has reason to believe
that proposition given her actual goals.
Then one can focus on the norm of ranking theory for systems of full
beliefs (Spohn 1988, 2009) instead of the norm of probabilism for systems of
degrees of belief or degree of belief functions; and one can adopt the global
goal of diachronic consistency for systems of full beliefs instead of the global
goal of not being accuracy dominated for systems of degrees of belief. Finally
one can enter the consistency argument for ranking functions (Huber 2007)
instead of the the gradational accuracy argument for probability measures.
4.2 Evidential Support and Belief
A function R ∶ AW → N ∪ {∞} from an algebra of propositions AW ⊆ ℘ (W )
over a set of possibilities W into the natural numbers N extended by infinity∞ is a ranking function if and only if (R1) the tautological proposition is as-
signed rank 0, R (W ) = 0, and (R2) the rank of a disjunction equals the min-
imum of the ranks of the disjuncts, R (A ∪B) = min{R (A) ,R (B)}. Con-
ditional ranks are defined as differences of unconditional ranks: R (A ∣ B) =
R (A ∩B)−R (B). Ranks are interpreted epistemically as grades of disbelief.
A proposition A is disbelieved if and only if its rank is positive, R (A) > 0. A
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proposition A is believed if and only if its negation is disbelieved, R(¬A) > 0.
(R1) requires that the tautological proposition not be disbelieved. Part of
what (R2) requires is that a disjunction be disbelieved just in case both dis-
juncts are disbelieved. Given the definition of conditional ranks, all (R2)
requires is that a disjunction be conditionally disbelieved just in case both
disjuncts are conditionally disbelieved.
(R1) and (R2) are synchronic rules for organizing one’s beliefs at a given
moment in time. Besides these ranking theory also includes diachronic rules
for updating one’s beliefs if new information of various formats is received.
The simplest of these rules, corresponding to strict conditionalization in the
probabilistic case and defined for the case where the new information comes
in form of a certainty, is plain conditionalization. According to it an agent’s
new ranking function should be her old ranking function conditional on the
information received. Other rules6 are defined for the case where the new
information comes in form of a partition of the space of possibilities and a
set of numbers characterizing the new strengths of belief in the elements of
the partition, or the degrees by which the strengths of belief in the elements
of the partition have changed.
Ranking theory is centered around the categorical notion of belief, and
thus much better suited for traditional philosophical purposes than proba-
bilism, which is centered around the quantitative notion of degree of belief.
Absolute evidential support is defined as conditional rank in the sense of a
ranking function R, which is interpreted as the agent’s rational system of
full belief: a proposition h is absolutely supported by the agent’s evidence
e if and only if h is rationally believed given e, R (¬h ∣ e) > 0. More gener-
ally, r is the agent’s degree of absolute evidential support for a proposition
h provided by the agent’s evidence e if and only if r is the agent’s rational
strength of disbelief for ¬h given e, r = R (¬h ∣ e).7 For the purposes of this
paper we can identify an agent’s evidence with the logically strongest propo-
sition e the agent is certain of in the sense of assigning its negation rank ∞,
6These other rules correspond to Jeffrey and Field conditionalization in the probabilistic
case. See Jeffrey (1983) and Field (1978) and Huber (2007).
7There is also a notion of incremental evidential support in ranking theory. See Spohn
(2009: 194ff).
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R (¬e) = ∞, although weaker notions of evidence are available, such as the
logically strongest proposition the agent believes, or the logically strongest
proposition the agent believes with sufficient strength.
Absolute evidential support is internally accessible for the agent, because
it is defined exclusively in terms of the agent’s rational system of full beliefs.
If the agent’s system of full beliefs is rational in the sense that it is a rank-
ing function, and if e is the agent’s evidence, i.e. is the logically strongest
proposition the agent is certain of in the sense of assigning its negation rank∞, then the agent’s rational strength of disbelief in any proposition h is her
degree of absolute evidential support for h given e. In this sense the agent
believes in accordance with her evidence. Thus, whether it is rational to
believe in accordance with one’s evidence depends on whether ranking func-
tions really are rational systems of full belief. This in turn depends on the
existence of an appropriate means-end relationship between being a ranking
function and having true beliefs. Logical entailment is such an appropriate
means-end relationship, and this means-end relationship is exactly what the
consistency argument establishes.
The conclusion of the consistency argument is the norm of ranking the-
ory that an agent’s system of full beliefs should obey the (synchronic and
diachronic rules of the) ranking calculus. An agent’s system of full beliefs
is said to be diachronically consistent if and only if it is and will always
be consistent and deductively closed. Thus, diachronic consistency is the
“eternal” version of the conjunction of consistency and deductive closure at
a given moment in time. It requires an agent’s system of full beliefs to be
“synchronically consistent”, i.e. consistent and deductively closed, at any
given moment in time, and to remain so when new information is received
and the system is updated. The requirement of diachronic consistency is
non-trivial in the sense that it does not allow an agent to move to an ar-
bitrary new system of full beliefs that is consistent and deductively closed,
because it also applies to the agent’s conditional beliefs. For instance, upon
becoming certain that p an agent cannot simply move from believing q and
disbelieving ¬q to disbelieving q and believing ¬q without also considering
the conditional beliefs in q given p and ¬q given p. The core of the argu-
ment is a theorem to the effect that an agent’s system of full beliefs obeys
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the (synchronic and diachronic rules of the) ranking calculus if and only if
it is diachronically consistent. Thus, obeying the norm of ranking theory is
a (provably necessary and sufficient) means to attaining the end of having
a diachronically consistent system of full beliefs. In other words, the norm
of ranking theory has a means-end justification with respect to the goal of
having a diachronically consistent system of full beliefs. Since the diachronic
consistency of a system of full beliefs is a necessary condition for the joint
truth of all the beliefs in the system at every moment in time, the consistency
argument establishes a (provably necessary) relationship between the norm
of ranking theory and the goal of “eternal” truth.8
For ease of reference let us repeat the second non-categorically normative
notion of evidential support that we have identified.
(E2) absolute evidential support in the sense of a ranking function R, which
is interpreted as the agent’s rational system of full belief: r is the agent’s
degree of absolute evidential support for a proposition h provided by
the agent’s evidence e if and only if r is the agent’s rational strength
of disbelief for ¬h given e, r = R (¬h ∣ e), where the agent’s evidence
e is the logically strongest proposition the agent is certain of in the
sense of assigning its negation rank ∞. In particular, a proposition h
is absolutely supported by the agent’s evidence e if and only if h is
rationally believed given e, R (¬h ∣ e) > 0.
This notion of evidential support is hypothetically normative. It is de-
fined to be identical with a ranking function which is interpreted as a rational
system of full beliefs. Therefore, in order to justify the norm that one ought
to believe in accordance with one’s evidence, it is necessary and sufficient to
provide a means-end justification for the norm of ranking theory. Since obey-
ing the norm of ranking theory is a provably necessary and sufficient means
to attaining the end of having a system of full beliefs that is diachronically
consistent, which in turn is a necessary condition for “eternal” truth, i.e. the
8Strictly speaking diachronic consistency is only necessary for the joint truth of all the
beliefs in the system and their logical consequences at every moment in time. We ignore
this complication in order to avoid a discussion of how to represent the contents of beliefs
and the precise formulation of the goal of having true beliefs.
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joint truth of all the beliefs in the system at every moment in time, believing
in accordance with one’s evidence is a provably necessary means to attaining
the end of having true beliefs.
Whichever, if any, of these goals one de facto has, the point to note is that
the normative notions of a rational system of full beliefs and of a rational
system of degrees of belief have means-end justifications with respect to the
default cognitive goals of believing the truth and believing accurately, and
so can be understood in instrumentalist terms. More precisely, by expressing
the terminal parameter of being true or at least diachronically consistent the
normative notion of a rational system of full beliefs becomes the descriptive
notion of a system of full beliefs that is a provably necessary (and sufficient)
means to attaining the end of being true (or diachronically consistent). Sim-
ilarly, by expressing the terminal parameter of being accurate or at least not
accuracy dominated the normative notion of a rational system of degrees of
belief becomes the descriptive notion of a system of degrees of belief that
is a provably necessary (and sufficient) means to attaining the end of being
accurate (or not accuracy dominated).
Consequently the normative notions of absolute evidential support that
are defined in terms of rational systems of full beliefs and rational systems of
degrees of belief are hypothetically normative, and so epistemic rationality
is a form of instrumental rationality. The reason for this is the following.
In Bayesianism absolute evidential support is defined exclusively in terms of
an agent’s rational degree of belief function, and in ranking theory absolute
evidential support is defined exclusively in terms of an agent’s rational system
of full beliefs. This is why absolute evidential support is internally accessible.
On these accounts the link between an agent’s degree of belief function or
system of full beliefs and evidential support is defined to be identity. This
is why an agent believes in accordance with her evidence if and only if her
degree of belief function or system of full beliefs is a probability measure or
ranking function, respectively. Therefore, once the norm of probabilism and
the norm of ranking theory are given a means-end justification, the norm that
an agent ought to believe in accordance with her evidence is automatically
given the same means-end justification. We conclude that absolute evidential
support saves the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality by being
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a hypothetically normative notion.
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